The stable matching problem is one of the central problems of algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties, the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality is an NP-hard problem, even when the ties are of size two. Moreover, in this setting it is UGC-hard to provide an approximation with a constant factor smaller than 4/3. In this paper, we give a tight analysis of an approximation algorithm given by Huang and Kavitha for the maximum cardinality stable matching problem with ties of size two, demonstrating an improved 4/3-approximation factor.
Introduction
The stable matching problem is of crucial importance in game theory. In an instance of a maximum cardinality stable matching problem we are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) with bipartition A and B. Following the standard terminology, we refer to A as men and B as women. For a ∈ A , we define N(a) to be the subset of nodes in B adjacent to a in G; analogously we define N(b) for b ∈ B.
Each person c ∈ A ∪ B has strict preferences over N(c). A matching M is called a stable matching if there are no a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that a is either unmatched or prefers b to the woman he is matched to by M and b is either unmatched or prefers a to the man she is matched to by M. Clearly, if a matching M is not stable, then it contains a pair (a, b), a ∈ A , b ∈ B satisfying the above conditions; such a pair (a, b) is called a blocking pair for M.
In their seminal work, Gale and Shapley developed a polynomial running time algorithm to find a stable matching [2] . Moreover, since all stable matchings have the same cardinality [3] , the algorithm of Gale and Shapley finds a maximum cardinality stable matching in polynomial running time. The situation changes when the people are allowed to have ties. In the case of ties, stable matchings for the same instance of a problem can have different cardinalities. Moreover, it is NP-hard to find a maximum cardinality stable matching even when there are ties of size two only [12] . In this case, it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum cardinality of a stable matching with a constant factor smaller than 21/19 and UGC (Unique Game Conjecture)-hard to approximate with a constant factor smaller than 4/3 [15] . We would like to note that the maximum cardinality stable matching problem with ties appears in diverse situations and thus approximation algorithms for different variants of this problem have been extensively studied [1, 5-10, 13, 14] .
To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm with the current-best approximation factor for the maximum cardinality stable matching problem with ties of size two is due to Huang and Kavitha [5] . In their paper, Huang and Kavitha provided an approximation algorithm for this problem and showed that the approximation factor of their algorithm is at most 10/7.
We would like to note that recently an approximation algorithm with factor 5/4 was provided for the case of one-sided ties of size two [11] . Moreover, for this case it is NP-hard to approximate the maximum cardinality of a stable matching with a constant factor smaller than 21/19 and UGC-hard to approximate with a constant factor smaller than 5/4 [4] .
Our Contribution
In this paper, we give a tight analysis of the approximation algorithm given by Huang and Kavitha [5] for the maximum cardinality stable matching problem with ties of size two, demonstrating an improved 4/3-approximation bound. Notably, any polynomial running time algorithm with a smaller approximation factor than 4/3 would automatically lead to refutation of the Unique Game Conjecture [15] .
To obtain our result we use a new charging scheme. In contrast to the charging scheme in [5] , our charging scheme is "local". In particular, the charging scheme in [5] creates charges from paths and distributes the charges along paths (using so called "good paths"), distributing the charges "globally". The charging scheme in [5] for the algorithm for the problem with ties of size two closely follows the original charging scheme in [5] for the algorithm for the problem with one-sided ties. Recently, the charging scheme for the problem with one-sided ties was substantially modified by Bauckholt, Pashkovich, and Sanità in [1] , where the modified charging scheme still has a "global" nature and distributes the charges along paths but in a more nuanced way (using so called "path jumps", "matching jumps", and "matching jumps with exception") than the original charging scheme in [5] . However, it is not clear whether the original charging scheme in [5] or the new ideas coming from the modified charging scheme in [1] could lead to a better analysis of the algorithm for the problem with ties of size two. Our charging scheme is different from the two charging schemes above; in particular, it is local and therefore much simpler to work with. To implement our charging scheme, we need to know only the local structure of the output matching, the local structure of an optimal matching, and the local structure of accepted proposals at the end of the algorithm. To sum up, in our charging scheme nodes get charges only from the proposals involving them, while in the charging schemes in [1, 5] the charges come from paths and are distributed to nodes along paths.
Comparison with Related Works
Here we provide a detailed comparison of our approach with approaches from [1, 5] .
The original paper [5] by Huang and Kavitha contained two algorithms: one for the problem with one-sided ties and one for the problem with ties of size two. Both algorithms consist of a series of proposals; and an output matching is constructed from the proposals accepted at the end of the algorithm. Recently, Bauckholt, Pashkovich and Sanità [1] provided a tight analysis of the algorithm from [5] for the case of one-sided ties. In our paper and in both [1, 5] , the analysis is based on charging schemes: first giving original charge to some objects and then redistributing this charge to nodes. The charging scheme for the problem with one-sided ties from [5] was substantially modified in [1] . In this paper, we give a new charging scheme which leads to a tight analysis for the problem with ties of size two.
Below we compare our charging scheme to those from the papers [1, 5].
Charging Scheme: Origin of Charges
In analyzing the approximation ratio, we first fix an optimal matching. In both [1, 5] , the charges are created by 5-augmenting paths for the output matching with respect to the fixed optimal matching. In [1] , the original charge is given to one man (the man in a "y-node") on each 5-augmenting path (see [1] , Section 4, p. 11). In [5] , the original charge is also given to each 5-augmenting path (see [5] , Section 2, p. 366 and Section 3, p. 377). In our charging scheme, the original charges are given to proposals. In particular, two charges are given to each of the proposals accepted at the end of the algorithm (one for the man and one for the woman participating in this proposal), except some special cases (if a proposal corresponds to a "bad output" it is given an extra charge for the man; if it corresponds to a "good input" it is given no charge for the woman). Because the total number of "bad outputs" is at most the number of "good inputs", the total number of charges in our approach is bounded from above by two times the number of proposals accepted at the end of the algorithm. Hence, our charging scheme, unlike charging schemes in [1, 5] , does not provide a mapping from 5-augmenting paths. As a result, the total number of charges generated in [1, 5] is equal to the number of 5-augmenting paths, while in our paper we know only that the total number of charges is bounded from above by two times the number of the proposals accepted at the end of the algorithm (that is why the total number of charges generated in our scheme is at most four times the size of the output matching).
Charging Scheme: Distribution of Charges
In both [1, 5] , the original charges are distributed "globally". In [5] , the original charges are first distributed to so called "good paths", and then are redistributed from "good paths" to nodes (see [5] , Section 2, p. 366 and Section 3, p. 377). In [1] , the original charges are also distributed globally. First, each original charge received by a man is distributed to some woman locally, but then the charges are redistributed globally using "path jumps", "matching jumps", and "matching jumps with exceptions" (see [1] , Section 4, p. 11). "Good paths", "path jumps", "matching jumps", and "matching jumps with exceptions" transfer the charges globally; i.e. they can transfer charges from one part of the graph generated by the fixed optimal matching and the proposals, which are accepted at the end of the algorithm, to another part of this graph. In our charging scheme, the original charges received by proposals are distributed locally. In particular, in our charging scheme each original charge of a proposal is distributed only to nodes participating in that proposal. Our origin of charges, together with our distribution of charges, forms a "local" charging scheme. In other words, the charges are generated by such objects as proposal (edges in the graph generated by the accepted proposals) and are distributed to nodes participating in these proposals (incident nodes). This makes our charging scheme easy to work with.
Charging Scheme: Charges at the Beginning and at the End
In order to compare the size of the output matching and the fixed optimal matching, it is natural to analyze the connected components in the union of these matchings. The approaches in [1, 5] were based on the following logic: the total number of generated charges was equal to the number of 5-augmenting paths and then the charges were distributed to other connected components, so that the total charge of each connected component was not too large with respect to the component's size. In other words, the approaches of [1, 5] were based on the idea that large connected components could "fix the damage" caused by 5-augmenting paths. Our approach is based on a different and a more direct idea. We show that every connected component receives a total charge of at least three times the number of the edges of the fixed optimal matching contained in that component. Together with the fact that the total number of charges generated in our algorithm is at most four times the size of the output matching, we immediately infer the desired approximation ratio.
Central Notions
In [1] , the notion of "popularity" was introduced for women. Roughly speaking, a woman is called popular with respect to some man, if this woman holds two proposals at the end of the algorithm and both these proposals are not worse than the proposals that that man can offer (see [1] , Section 3, p. 6). This notion was important for the tight analysis provided in [1] . We use a different notion of "popularity" in the current paper. For us, a woman is popular if she rejected a proposal during the algorithm. We also introduce further notions, for example "successful". We call a woman (a man) "successful" if this woman (this man) has two proposals (accepted) at the end of the algorithm. For working with connected components, we use the notion of "pointing" similar to the notion of "pointing" in [1] (see [1] , Section 4, p. 14).
Algorithm by Huang and Kavitha
First, let us describe the algorithm by Huang and Kavitha [5] . The description of the algorithm closely follows the description of the algorithm by Huang and Kavitha [5] for the maximum cardinality stable matching problem with one-sided ties from [1] .
A stable matching is computed in two phases. In the first phase, called the proposal phase, men (in arbitrary order) make proposals to women, while women accept, bounce, forward, or reject proposals. In the second phase, we consider a graph based on the proposals at the end of the first phase, which in turn leads to an output stable matching.
Before we describe the algorithm by Huang and Kavitha [5] , let us introduce the following notions related to preferences. Let a ∈ A and a � ∈ A be on the preference list of b ∈ B ; i.e., a and a ′ are in N(b). Then we can compare a and a ′ from the perspective of b. If a and a ′ are tied on the list of b , we say that b is indifferent between them, denoted by a ≃ b a � . Further, if b ranks a strictly higher than a ′ on her preference list, then we say that b (strongly) prefers a to a ′ , denoted by a > b a ′ ; otherwise, we say that b weakly prefers a ′ to a, denoted by a ′ ≥ b a . In other words, if b weakly prefers a ′ to a, then b is either indifferent between a and a ′ or strongly prefers a ′ to a. Analogously, we define indifference b � ≃ a b , weak preference b ′ ≥ a b , and (strong) preference b ′ > a b for men over women.
Proposals
Each man a ∈ A has two proposals p 1 a and p 2 a . Initially, both p 1 a and p 2 a are offered to the first woman on a's list. At each moment of the algorithm every man has one of the following three statuses: basic, 1-promoted, and 2-promoted. Each man keeps a rejection history to record the women who have rejected him in his current status.
If a proposal p i a , i = 1, 2 is rejected by a woman b on a's list, then the proposal p i a goes to a most preferred woman on a's list who has not rejected a in his current status. In the case when there is no woman on a's list who has not rejected a in his current status, the man a changes his status as described below or stops making proposals. If the man a changes his status, his rejection history is emptied and a starts making proposals again by proposing to a most preferred woman on his list. Note that in the case where there are two most preferred women on a's list who have not rejected him in his current status, the man a breaks the tie arbitrarily.
Each man a ∈ A starts as a basic man. If every woman in N(a) rejects a proposal of a at least once, the man a becomes 1-promoted. If afterwards every woman in N(a) again rejects a proposal of a as a 1-promoted man at least once, the man a becomes 2-promoted. Finally, if every woman in N(a) rejects a proposal of a as a 2-promoted man at least once, the man a stops making proposals.
Proposal Acceptance
A woman b, who gets a proposal p i a from a man a, always accepts it if at that moment b holds at most one proposal excluding p i a . Otherwise, b tries to make a bounce step, and if the bounce step is not successful, b tries to make a forward step.
• Bounce step In this case the woman b at the moment holds two proposals, p i ′ a ′ and p i ′′ a ′′ , and receives a third proposal p i a . If for some ∈ {a, a � , a �� } there exists a woman such that b ≃ and at the moment holds at most one proposal, then a proposal from to b is bounced to and the bounce step is considered successful. • Forward step In this case the woman b at the moment holds two proposals, p i ′ a ′ and p i ′′ a ′′ , and receives a third proposal p i a . If two of the proposals in {p i a , p i � a � , p i �� a �� } are from the same man and there exists a woman distinct from b such that b ≃ and has not rejected in his current status, then the proposal p 1 from to b is forwarded to , b keeps the other two proposals, and the forward step is considered successful.
If b holds proposals p i ′ a ′ and p i ′′ a ′′ and receives a different proposal p i a , but both the bounce and forward steps are not successful, then b rejects any of the least desirable proposals as defined below, breaking ties arbitrarily. Note that a proposal of a man which is bounced or forwarded is not considered as rejected, so there is no update of the rejection history for any of the men during the bounce or forward steps.
For a woman b, proposal p i a is superior to p i ′ a ′ if one of the following is true
a is a least desirable proposal among the set of proposals that a woman b has if it is not superior to any other proposal in the set.
There is also a special case for the rejection step. Assume that b holds two proposals p i ′ a ′ , p i ′′ a ′′ and receives a different proposal p i a , where a ≃ b a � ≃ b a �� and the promotion statuses of a, a ′ , and a ′′ are the same. Clearly, since the ties are of size 2, we have that two of the three proposals p i a , p i ′ a ′ , and p i ′′ a ′′ are from the same man. In this special case, b rejects one of the proposals from that man.
The Output Matching
Let G ′ be the bipartite graph with the node set A ∪ B and the edge set E ′ , where E ′ consists of the edges (a, b), a ∈ A , and b ∈ B such that at the end of the algorithm b holds at least one proposal from a. Note for the sake of exposition that we allow G ′ to contain two parallel edges of the form (a, b), a ∈ A and b ∈ B , when at the end of the algorithm b holds two proposals from a. Clearly, the degree of a node in G ′ is at most two, since each man has accepted at most two proposals and each woman is holding at most two proposals at any point in time. Let M be a maximum cardinality matching in G ′ where all degree two nodes of G ′ are matched. In [5] , it was shown that the matching M is a stable matching in the graph G.
Theorem 1 [5] The total number of proposals made during the algorithm is O(|E|) and the output matching is a stable matching in G = (A ∪ B, E).
Tight Analysis
Let be a stable matching of the maximum cardinality, and let M be a stable matching output by the algorithm. If b ∈ B is matched with a ∈ A in , we use the following notation: A woman b ∈ B is called successful if she holds two proposals at the end of the algorithm; i.e., b is successful if the degree of b in G ′ is two. Similarly, a man a ∈ A is successful if both of his proposals are accepted at the end of the algorithm; i.e., a is successful if the degree of a in G ′ is two. We call a person unsuccessful if that person is not successful. Further, if during the algorithm a woman rejected a proposal, we call her popular; otherwise, we call her unpopular.
The next remark follows directly from the algorithm of Huang and Kavitha [5] and helps to understand the bouncing step better. Proof Assume for the sake of contradiction that b is popular. Then b has rejected a proposal. This rejection occurred either before or after b accepted the above proposal from a. If the rejection occurred after, then the proposal from a should have been bounced from b to b ′ immediately before the rejection. If the rejection occurred before, then the proposal from a should have been bounced from b to b ′ before being accepted by b. Then in either case the proposal from a would have been bounced to b ′ , who, being unsuccessful, would have accepted it. The proposal would then never have returned to b as b ′ is unsuccessful. But b indeed has the proposal from a and b ′ is unsuccessful, contradiction. ◻
Inputs and Outputs
Inputs and outputs are central objects for our charging scheme, i.e. for defining a cost of a node in G. These objects give us a possibility to handle the case when there are M-augmenting paths of length 5. Intuitively, these paths, or rather the nodes in these paths, are necessarily "volatile" with respect to the algorithm. This "volatility" must be compensated for by transferring some of it to "less volatile" components. This is achieved by the manipulation of inputs and outputs, or rather the preferences and proposals which underlie them. Intuitively, a bad output is an output from a man, where he needs to transfer "volatility" out of the connected component. A bad input is an input to a woman, where she cannot withstand any more "volatility" Given a woman b ∈ B , we say that an edge e incident to b in G ′ is an input to b if e is not in and not in M. Given a man a ∈ A , an output from a is an edge e incident to a in G ′ such that e is not in and not in M. In other words, an edge
Note that if in G ′ there are two parallel edges e 1 and e 2 of the form (a, b), then M must contain the edge (a, b). In this case, one of the parallel edges {e 1 , e 2 } is associated with M, while the other is counted as an input and an output unless also contains (a, b), in which case it is associated with . Note that outputs are for men and inputs are for women. Further, note that as all degree-2 nodes in G ′ are matched in M, a node may have at most one output or input.
An input (a, b) to b ∈ B is called a bad input if one of the following is true:
An output (a, b) from a man a is called a bad output if one of the following is true:
a) and a is not 2-promoted. • b ≃ a (a) , but (a) is unsuccessful.
A good output from a man a is an output (a, b) that is not a bad output. Equivalently, an output (a, b) from a ∈ A is a good output if one of the following is true:
Lemma 1 There is no edge which is both a bad input and a bad output.
Proof Assume that an edge (a, b) , a ∈ A , b ∈ B is both a bad input to b and a bad output from a . From the definitions of bad inputs and bad outputs, we have that one of the following is true:
and (a) is unsuccessful; b is popular.
In Case (1), the edge (a, b) is a blocking pair for , contradicting the stability of . In Case (2), since (b) is unsuccessful, (b) is 2-promoted and was rejected by b in that status. On the other hand, we have that a ≃ b (b) , a is not 2-promoted, and at the end of the algorithm b holds a proposal from a, contradicting the fact that b rejected a proposal from (b) when he was 2-promoted. In Case (3), we have a contradiction to Remark 1 where b � ∶= (a).
Corollary 1 The number of good inputs is not smaller than the number of bad outputs.
Proof Assume for the sake of contradiction that the number of good inputs is in fact smaller than the number of bad outputs. Then there must exist some edge in G ′ that is a bad output and not a good input. That is, it is a bad output and a bad input, contradicting Lemma 1. ◻
Cost
For a man a ∈ A , we define his cost as follows:
For a woman b ∈ B , we define her cost as follows: In Case (1), a is unsuccessful. Since (a, b) is an edge in G, b rejected a proposal from a at least once and so b is popular. Thus, there are two distinct edges (a � , b) , (a �� , b) in G ′ such that a ≤ b a ′ and a ≤ b a ′′ . It is straightforward to check that neither (a � , b) nor (a �� , b) is a good input. Thus we have (b) = 2 , implying the desired inequality of ({a, b}) ≥ (b) = 2. In Case (2), a is unsuccessful. Since (a, b) is an edge in G, b rejected a proposal from a at least once and so b is popular. However, deg(b) ≤ 1 and so b cannot be popular, contradiction.
In Case (3), as b holds no proposals at the end of the algorithm, a did not ever propose to b during the algorithm. Thus in G ′ there are two distinct edges (a, b � ) and (a, b �� ) with b ≤ a b ′ , b ≤ a b ′′ . Since deg(b) = 0 , neither of the edges is in . Also, only one can be in M, so one must be an output, and in particular a bad output. Thus, we have (a) = 3 , implying ({a, b}) = 3. In Case (4), we have deg(a) = 2 and so (a) ≥ 2 . If deg(b) = 2 then (b) ≥ 1 , so ({a, b}) ≥ 3 and we are finished. Otherwise, we have that deg(b) = 1 . If b has no good input, then (b) = 1 and we are again finished. Then we consider the case where deg(b) = 1 and b has a good input. In this case, b is not successful and the only proposal b holds is an input. Then a did not not propose to b. Then, similar to Case (3), we have that a has a bad input, and (a) ≥ 3 , and we are finished.
In Case (5), we have
providing the desired inequality. In Case (6), a is unsuccessful. Since (a, b) is an edge in G, b rejected a proposal from a at least once and so b is popular. Let (a � , b) be the good input to b. Since b rejected a proposal from a, we have that a ′ ≥ b a . Thus b is popular, (b) = a is unsuccessful, and a ′ ≥ b a , showing that the input (a � , b) is a bad input, contradiction.
Then in all cases we have that ({a, b}) ≥ 2 , and if deg(a) ≥ 1 (as in Case (3) through Case (5)), then ({a, b}) ≥ 3 , as desired. ◻
Connected Components in + M
In this section, we start to relate the ratio between | | and |M| to the ratios between | ∩ C| and (C) for connected components C in + M . For simplicity of exposition, isolated nodes in + M are considered by us as trivial connected components in + M. 
Remark 2 Let C be a connected component of M + which consists of a single node. Then we have (C) ≥ 3| ∩ C| = 0 , trivially.
Alternating Paths, Alternating Cycles and -Augmenting Paths
The following corollary of Lemma 2 establishes an upper bound on the number of edges in a connected component of M + in terms of the component's cost, applying only to alternating paths of even length, alternating cycles, and -augmenting paths. Note that an edge which is in both M and is considered by us to be a trivial alternating cycle if it corresponds to two parallel edges in G ′ .
Corollary 2 Let C be a connected component of M +
that is an alternating path of even length, alternating cycle, or -augmenting path. Then we have
Proof Let C be a connected component of M + which is an alternating path of even length, alternating cycle, or -augmenting path. Then one of the following is true:
and (a 1 , b 1 ) ∈ .
In Cases (1), (2) and (3), by Lemma 2, for each i = 1, … , k we have ({a i , b i }) ≥ 3 . Thus, we have the desired inequality:
In Case (4), by Lemma 2, for each i = 2, … , k we have
Since a k+1 is matched in M, we have that (a k+1 ) ≥ deg(a k+1 ) ≥ 1 , and thus we have the desired inequality:
◻ The next remark is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.
Remark 3 An edge (a, b) that exists in both M and defines a connected component C in M + . If (a, b) does not correspond to a parallel edge in G ′ , then (C) ≥ 3 = 3|C ∩ | = 3.
M-Augmenting Paths
In this section, we study connected components in M + which are M-augmenting paths. First, we state the result of Huang and Kavitha [5] , showing that there exists no M-augmenting path of length 1 or of length 3 in M + .
Lemma 4 [5]
There is no M-augmenting path in M + of length 1 or of length 3.
Now let us consider M-augmenting paths in M +
of length at least 5. Given an M-augmenting path of the form a 0 − b 0 − a 1 − ⋯ − a k − b k with a 0 ∈ A , for i = 0, … , k − 1 we say that b i points right if one of the following is true:
• a i+1 ≃ b i a i and at the end of the algorithm a i+1 is not basic.
Then for every i = 1, … , k − 1 , at least one of the following is true: Proof Clearly, the edges (a i , b i−1 ) and (a i+1 , b i ) exist in G ′ since these edges exist in M . Thus we have deg(a i ) ≥ 1 and deg(b i ) ≥ 1 . Moreover, since the edge (a i , b i ) exists in G , at least one of the following is true: deg(a i ) ≥ 2 or deg(b i ) ≥ 2 . Hence, it is enough to consider the following cases:
2.1. b i rejected a proposal from a i during the algorithm.
2.1.1. b i has no good input. 2.1.2. b i has a good input.
there is an edge
. a i has a bad output. 2.4. a i has a good output; b i did not reject any proposals from a i during the algorithm.
We would like to note that while the above cases are not mutually exclusive, they are exhaustive.
In Case (1), a i is unsuccessful. Thus, b i rejected a proposal from a i as a 2-promoted man. On the other hand, at the end of the algorithm b i has a proposal from a i+1 , implying (2) .
In Case (2.1.1), we have deg(b i ) = 2 , since b i rejected a proposal from a i during the algorithm. Since b i has no good input, we have
Thus, we have implying (1).
In Case (2.1.2), b i is popular, since b i rejected a proposal during the algorithm. Let (a � , b i ) be the good input to b i . Since (a � , b i ) is a good input to b i , we have a i ≥ b i a ′ and a ′ ≠ a i . Since during the algorithm b i rejected a proposal from a i , but at the end of the algorithm has proposals from a i+1 and a ′ , we have a i ≤ b i a i+1 and
Since a i ≤ b i a i+1 , a i ≃ b i a � , a ′ ≠ a i and ties are of size 2, we either have a i < b i a i+1 or a � = a i+1 . If we have a i < b i a i+1 , then (2) holds. If a � = a i+1 then at some point b i rejected a proposal from a i while at the end of the algorithm b i holds two proposals from a i+1 . If a i+1 is basic, this contradicts the special case for the rejection step, because a i ≃ b i a i+1 . Then a i+1 is not basic, implying that b i points right and thus (2) .
In Case (2.2), b i is adjacent to a i and a i+1 in G ′ , so b i has no inputs. Also, a i has no outputs, and thus (b) ≥ 1 . We also have (a i ) = deg(a i ) + 1 = 3 , since a i has a bad output. Thus, (1) . In Case (2.4), let (a i , b � ) be the good output from a i . Since b i did not reject any proposals from a i during the algorithm, we have that a i is basic and also that b i ≤ a i b i−1 and b i ≤ a i b ′ hold. Since a i is basic and (a i , b � ) is a good output from a i , we have that
, we have that if b i−1 rejected a proposal from a i−1 during the algorithm and b i−1 points right, then b i rejected a proposal from a i during the algorithm and b i points right.
Proof By Lemma 5, we have that at least one of the following statements is true: 
In Case (1), we have a contradiction to ({a i , b i }) = 3 . Let us consider Case (3). Since a i is basic and b i−1 points right, we have a i > b i−1 a i−1 . Thus, we have a i > b i−1 a i−1 and b i−1 > a i b i , showing that (a i , b i−1 ) is a blocking pair for , contradicting the stability of . In Case (2), we obtain the desired statement immediately. ◻
Moreover, b 0 rejected a proposal from a 0 during the algorithm and b 0 points right.
Proof Clearly, a 0 is not matched by M and so a 0 must be unsuccessful. Thus, b 0 rejected a proposal from a 0 as a 2-promoted man. Hence, b 0 is popular and if (a, b 0 ) is an edge in G ′ then a ≥ b 0 a 0 = (b 0 ) . This demonstrates that b 0 has no good input, and so ({a 0 , b 0 }) ≥ (b 0 ) = 2. Now, at some point during the algorithm b 0 rejected a proposal from a 0 as a 2-promoted man, but at the end of the algorithm b 0 has a proposal from a 1 , showing that b 0 points right and finishing the proof. ◻
Proof Clearly, b k is not matched by M and so b k must be unsuccessful. Hence, a k is basic and a k is successful. If at the end of the algorithm b k holds a proposal from a k , then b k has no input. Thus,
If at the end of the algorithm b k holds no proposal from a k , then a k has an output (a k , b � ) with b ′ ≥ a k b k . Thus, (a k , b � ) is a bad output, implying that (a k ) = deg(a k ) + 1 = 3 and thus that
where a 0 ∈ A . If b k−2 rejected a proposal from a k−2 during the algorithm and b k−2 points right, then
Proof For the proof of the lemma it is enough to consider the following cases:
1. b k−1 did not reject any proposals from a k−1 during the algorithm. 2. b k−1 rejected a proposal from a k−1 during the algorithm.
In Case (1), since b k−1 did not reject any proposal from a k−1 during the algorithm, we have that a k−1 is basic and M(a k−1 ) = b k−2 ≥ a k−1 b k−1 . Since a k−1 is basic and b k−2 points right, we have a k−1 > b k−2 a k−2 . Moreover, we have b k−2 ≤ a k−1 b k−1 , since otherwise (a k−1 , b k−2 ) is a blocking pair for , contradicting the stability of
The forwarding step excludes the possibility of b k−2 having two proposals from a k−1 at the end of the algorithm while also having rejected a proposal at some point. On the other hand, we have that a k−1 is basic and by the statement of the lemma b k−2 rejected a proposal from a k−2 during the algorithm, showing that there exists an edge
, and ties are of size two, we have that
This also gives us the desired inequality In Case (2), b k−1 holds a proposal from a k but rejected a k−1 . Then we know that a k ≥ b k−1 a k−1 .
First, assume that a k > b k−1 a k−1 . Then we have b k−1 ≤ a k b k , since otherwise (a k , b k−1 ) is a blocking pair for , contradicting the stability of . On the other hand, b k is unsuccessful, as she is unmatched in M , and an edge (a k , b k−1 ) exists in G ′ , so we have b k−1 ≥ a k b k . Thus, we have b k−1 ≃ a k b k . But b k−1 holds a proposal from a k . By Remark 1, we have that b k−1 must be unpopular. But b k−1 is popular by assumption, having rejected a proposal from a k−1 , contradiction.
Then it must be that a k ≃ b k−1 a k−1 . As b k−1 is popular, she holds two proposals. One is a proposal from a k , which corresponds to an edge in M . We consider the other proposal. If it is an input from some a ′ , a ′ ≠ a k , a � ≠ a k−1 , then a � ≥ b k−1 a k−1 , as a k−1 was rejected by b k−1 . But as ties are of size two, and a k ≃ b k−1 a k−1 , we have a � > b k−1 a k−1 . Then it is a bad input, and we have
Also, due to the fact that a k ≃ b k−1 a k−1 and the fact that at the end of the algorithm b k−1 has a proposal from a k as a basic man, we have that a k−1 is successful. Since a k−1 is successful, we have (a k−1 ) ≥ deg(a k−1 ) = 2 , implying the desired inequality
Otherwise, the other proposal is from a k or a k−1 . Assume that it is from a k . As b k is unmatched in M , b k is unsuccessful, and thus a k is basic. Then a k ≃ b k−1 a k−1 , b k−1 has two proposals from basic a k , and b k−1 rejected a proposal from a k−1 . But this contradicts the special case of the rejection step. Then the proposal must be from a k−1 . Then directly, we have (a k−1 ) = deg(a k−1 ) = 2 and (b k−1 ) = deg(b k−1 ) = 2 , implying the desired inequality Theorem 2 | |∕|M| ≤ 4∕3.
The next example demonstrates that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight. In the description of this example we closely follow the description style from [1] . Fig. 1 , the circle nodes represent men and the square nodes represent women. The solid lines represent the edges in G ′ . The arrow tips indicate the preferences of each person. For example, b 0 has double-tipped arrows pointing to a 1 and a 3 and a single-tipped arrow pointing to a 0 , so b 0 is indifferent between a 1 and a 3 and prefers both to a 0 .
Example 1 In
It is straightforward to verify that there exists a unique maximum cardinality stable matching, namely = {(a 0 , b 0 ), (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ), (a 3 , b 3 )} . We can prove that there exists an execution of the algorithm with the above intermediate graph G ′ . Hence, for this execution one of the possible outputs is the matching M = {(a 1 , b 0 ), (a 2 , b 1 ), (a 3 , b 3 )} , leading to the ratio | |∕|M| = 4∕3.
Proof Let us provide an execution of the algorithm leading to the above intermediate graph G ′ .
• a 3 proposes to b 3 ; b 3 accepts. • a 3 proposes to b 0 ; b 0 accepts. • a 2 proposes to b 3 ; b 3 accepts. • a 2 proposes to b 1 ; b 1 accepts. • a 1 proposes to b 1 ; b 1 accepts. • a 1 proposes to b 0 ; b 0 accepts. • a 0 begins proposing to b 0 , but each time a 0 makes a proposal, the proposal is rejected. a 0 gives up.
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